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THE INTERNET IS NOT A LAWLESS 
PRAIRIE: DATA PROTECTION AND  
PRIVACY IN ITALY 
Noah C.N. Hampson* 
Abstract: As the Internet has become more pervasive, so too have con-
cerns about the security of personal data online. The rapid evolution of 
Internet technology has outpaced the legislative process, leaving courts to 
resolve complex and important questions of policy. Their answers to these 
questions can have dramatic implications for the future of the Internet as 
a platform for global communication. The judicial decisions in this area 
are frequently issued ad hoc by judges who may be unfamiliar with the 
technology at issue and unaware of the potential ramifications of their 
rulings. The February 2010 conviction in Italy of three Google executives 
for violations of data protection laws sparked widespread controversy and 
criticism on this basis. This Comment argues that the Italian court’s deci-
sion is a prominent example of the broader trend of inexpert judicial 
regulation of the Internet. 
Introduction 
 On February 24, 2010, Italian Judge Oscar Magi convicted three 
Google executives for violations of Italian data protection laws after a 
video was uploaded to Google Video showing an autistic student being 
bullied by classmates.1 Although the substance of the court’s decision 
was not released until April 12, the announcement immediately ignited 
controversy and debate over the decision’s ramifications for Internet 
regulation and freedom of expression.2 Some commentators assailed 
 
 
* Noah C.N. Hampson is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. He would like to thank Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea for providing the 
inspiration for this Comment, Steven Joseph for his invaluable editorial assistance, and 
Olga Laur for her support and encouragement. 
1 See Trib. Ordinario di Milano, 24 febbraio 2010, Sentenza n. 1972/2010 [Ordinary Tri-
bunal of Milan, Feb. 24, 2010, Judgment n. 1972/2010] at 108, available at http://speciali. 
espresso.repubblica.it//pdf/Motivazioni_sentenza_Google.pdf. 
2 See, e.g., Rachel Donadio, Larger Threat Is Seen in Google Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 
2010, at A1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/technology/companies/ 
25google.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1; Thomas Claburn, Google Execs Convicted in Italy, Infor- 
mationWeek (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/utility_ 
ondemand/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=223100601; Paul McNamara, Conviction of Google 
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the verdict as a threat to commercial Internet companies and to the 
freedom of the World Wide Web.3 Others welcomed it as a vindication 
of an individual’s right to privacy.4 
 Prosecutors originally charged four Google executives with defa-
mation, and three with violating Italy’s Personal Data Protection Code.5 
When the decision was finally released, it revealed that the court had 
convicted the executives charged with violation of data protection law 
but had acquitted them all of the defamation charge.6 Surprisingly, the 
court imposed liability despite Italian regulations,7 European Union 
directives,8 and a contemporaneous judgment by the European Court 
of Justice,9 all of which exempted certain categories of information so-
ciety service providers (ISSPs) from liability for user-generated con-
tent.10 The court’s decision substantiates concerns that advances in 
technology vastly exceed the pace of formal Internet regulation.11 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
Execs in Italy Sheer Madness, Network World (Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.network 
world.com/news/2010/022410-buzzblog-google-execs-convicted.html. 
3 See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Google Italy Ruling Threatens YouTube Pursuit of Profitability, 
Guardian (London) (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/feb/ 
24/google-italy-youtube-video-analysis; Mike Melanson, Italy Attacks Web Democracy with 
Google Convictions, ReadWriteWeb (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.readwriteweb.com/ar- 
chives/italy_at-tacks_basis_of_web_20_with_google_convicti.php. 
4 See Marc Rotenberg, Brandeis in Italy: The Privacy Issues in the Google Video Case, Huffing-
ton Post (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-rotenberg/brandeis-in-italy- 
the-pri_b_481115.html. 
5 Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at I–II; Giovanni Sartor & Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha, The 
Italian Google-Case: Privacy, Freedom of Speech and Responsibility of Providers for User-Generated Con-
tents, 18 Int’l J.L. & Info. Tech. 356, 357 (2010). 
6 Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at I–II, 108; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 358. 
7 See Decreto Legislativo, 30 Giugno 2003, n. 196, in G.U. 29 Luglio 2003, n. 174 (It.) 
[Legislative Decree, June 30, 2003, n. 196, in G.U. July 29 2003]; Decreto Legislativo, 9 
Aprile 2003, n. 70, in G.U. 14 Aprile 2003, n. 87 (It.) [Legislative Decree, Apr. 9, 2003, n. 
70, in G.U. Apr. 14 2003, n. 87], art. 16. 
8 See Council Directive 2000/31, art. 15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). 
9 See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Mal-
letier SA, para. 109 (2010) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm, (follow 
“Case-law” hyperlink under “Collections”; search “2010” under “Access by Year”; follow 
“March” hyperlink; select Case “C-236/08”). 
10 See Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 360–61; Philip Willan, Milan Judge: The Internet Is 
Not a Lawless Prairie, Network World (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.networkworld.com/ 
news/2010/041210-milan-judge-the-internet-is.html. “Information society service” is de-
fined as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services.” Council Directive 98/48, 
art. 1(1)–(2)(a), 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18 (EC). 
11 See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1370 (1996) (arguing that the Internet undermines the link 
between geographical location and government power to regulate online behavior); Paul 
Krugman, Facing the Music, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2000, at WK15 (suggesting that technology 
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decision also raises serious questions about the data protection respon-
sibilities of ISSPs and the viability of a truly “free” Internet in the inter-
national marketplace.12 
 Part I of this Comment provides background on the trial and the 
case against Google. Part II discusses existing European Union and Ital-
ian law pertaining to data protection and Internet privacy. It also ex-
plains a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice interpreting 
the responsibilities of ISSPs with regard to personal privacy. Part III 
analyzes the reasoning by which the court reconciled its decision to 
impose liability with seemingly contradictory precedent. This section 
also interprets the Google decision in the context of the broader inter-
national debate over Internet regulation; specifically, it focuses on the 
increasingly prominent role of courts in regulating the Internet. Fi-
nally, this Comment concludes that because the rate of technological 
advances far outpaces efforts at formal rulemaking, Internet regulation 
is occurring in courts around the world on an ad hoc basis, with signifi-
cant ramifications for privacy rights, freedom of expression, and the 
future of the Internet itself. 
I. Background 
 On September 8, 2006, an Internet user named Giulia Lisa up-
loaded a three-minute video to Google Video depicting an autistic boy 
named Francesco Giovanni De Leon being harassed and insulted by a 
group of schoolmates in Turin, Italy.13 Over the next two months, the 
video was viewed more than five thousand times and became one of the 
most popular videos in Google Video’s “Funny” category.14 During that 
                                                                                                                      
is eliminating national boundaries and hindering government’s ability to collect tax reve-
nue); Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1996, at D1 
(noting that the “Internet has evolved faster than the laws and technical structures of the 
countries it touches”). 
12 See Adam Liptak, When American and European Ideas of Privacy Collide, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
27, 2010, at WK1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/weekinreview/28 
liptak.html; Danny O’Brien, The Google Three: Italy’s Personal Attack on Intermediary Liability, 
Elec. Frontier Found. (Feb. 27, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/02/google-
three-italys-personal-attack-intermediary-0; Reflecting on Google in Italy (and Beyond): Implica-
tions for Online Privacy and Freedom of Expression in the Internet Age, Global Network Initia-
tive (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/issues/Google_Italy.php. 
13 Trib. Ordinario di Milano, 24 febbraio 2010, Sentenza n. 1972/2010 [Ordinary Tri-
bunal of Milan, Feb. 24, 2010, Judgment n. 1972/2010] at II, 102, available at http:// 
speciali.espresso.repubblica.it//pdf/Motivazioni_sentenza_Google.pdf; see Sartor & Viola, 
supra note 5, at 356–57. Lisa, the uploader, was not charged in this action. Sentenza, at 
102. 
14 Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 357. 
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time, users commented on the video and some may even have flagged it 
for inappropriate content.15 On November 6, 2006 Google received an 
email from a user complaining about the video and requesting its re-
moval.16 Although there is evidence that Google employees undertook 
to remove it within twenty-four hours,17 the video was not actually re-
moved until Italian police contacted Google and demanded that the 
video be taken down.18 A two-year investigation ensued, and in early 
November 2008 four Google executives—David Drummond, senior 
vice-president and chief legal officer; Peter Fleischer, global privacy 
counsel; Arvind Desikan, senior product marketing manager; and 
George Reyes, former chief financial officer—were charged in Italian 
court with defamation and violation of Italy’s Personal Data Protection 
Code.19 
 The defamation charge alleged that Google and its executives had 
contributed to the defamation of the student depicted in the video.20 
Prosecutors argued that by failing to exercise any positive control to 
prevent defamatory content from appearing on Google Video, Google 
had violated Article 40 of the Italian Criminal Code.21 The data protec-
tion charge alleged that Google illegally processed sensitive personal 
data for the purpose of obtaining a gain in violation of Section 167 of 
Italy’s Personal Data Protection Code.22 After a bench trial presided 
over by Judge Magi, all four executives were ultimately acquitted of the 
defamation charge, but three were convicted of violating provisions of 
the Personal Data Protection Code and sentenced to six-month sus-
pended prison terms.23 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. 
16 Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at 102; Caso Google, Com’é Andata [The Google Case, What 
Happened], Il Repubblica (Mar. 1, 2010), http://espresso.repubblica.it/dettaglio//2121920. 
17 See Caso Google, Com’é Andata, supra note 16. 
18 See Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 357; Caso Google, Com’é Andata, supra note 16. 
19 See Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 357. 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 359 (explaining that Article 40 imposes criminal liability for “failing to pre-
vent an event which one has the legal obligation to prevent,” and that such failure 
“amounts to causing” that event). 
22 Id. at 361–62. 
23 Sentenza n. 1972/2010 at 108; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 358. Arvind Desikan 
was acquitted of all charges. Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at 108. 
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II. Discussion 
A. The European Union Directives 
 In the past fifteen years, the European Parliament has issued sev-
eral Directives to member states of the European Union concerning 
Internet regulations. In particular, Directive 2000/31 (Liability Direc-
tive) promulgates regulations intended to ensure “a high level of 
Community legal integration in order to establish a real area without 
internal borders for information society services.”24 Although the Di-
rective provides that “the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data is solely governed by Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council . . . and Directive 
97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,”25 Articles 
12–14 establish certain liability exemptions for information society ser-
vices.26 These Articles specifically exempt services that are limited to a 
“mere conduit” of data,27 “caching,”28 or “hosting.”29 In addition, Arti-
cle 15 prevents member states from imposing a general obligation on 
providers of these services to monitor information they transmit or 
store.30 It also prevents member states from imposing a general obliga-
tion to actively investigate illegal activity.31 
 With regard to personal data, Directive 95/46 (Privacy Directive) 
articulates principles for the protection of “fundamental rights and 
freedoms” of natural persons—in particular the right to privacy—in the 
processing of personal data.32 The Privacy Directive also prohibits in-
terference with the free flow of personal data between member states 
                                                                                                                      
24 Council Directive 2000/31, para. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). 
25 Id. para. 14. 
26 See id. arts. 12–14. 
27 Id. art. 12. 
28 Id. art. 13. 
29 Id. art. 14. 
30 Directive 2000/31, art. 15. 
31 Id. 
32 Council Directive 95/46, art. 1(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). “Personal data” is de-
fined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in par-
ticular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” Id. art. 2(a). “Proc-
essing” is defined as “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal 
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, stor-
age, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dis-
semination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction.” Id. art. 2(b). 
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except under certain circumstances.33 The overarching purpose is to 
coordinate regulation across member states, thereby ensuring uniform 
protection of individual rights, removing impediments to economic 
activity and law enforcement, and still leaving some latitude for states to 
tailor national data protection laws within a limited margin.34 
B. Italian Law 
 Italian Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003, known as the 
Personal Data Protection Code (PDPC), regulates all personal data 
processing in Italy.35 Unlike the Privacy Directive, which addresses con-
cerns relating both to protection of personal data and to preserving the 
free flow of information between EU member states,36 the purpose of 
the PDPC is to “ensure that personal data are processed by respecting 
data subjects’ rights, fundamental freedoms and dignity, particularly 
with regard to confidentiality, personal identity, and the right to per-
sonal data protection.”37 Pursuant to the Privacy Directive, Section 153 
establishes the Italian personal data protection supervisory authority 
charged with enforcing data protection rules: the Garante Per La Pro-
tezione Dei Dati Personali (Garante).38 The PDPC requires the consent 
of the data subject before personal data may be processed.39 Addition-
ally, when the data consist of “sensitive” information, the written con-
sent of the data subject is required, as well as written permission from 
the Garante.40 
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. art. 1(2). 
34 See id. paras.7–9. 
35 Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 362 n.15; see Decreto Legislativo, 30 Giugno 2003, n. 
196, in G.U. 29 Luglio 2003, n. 174 (It.) [Legislative Decree, June 30, 2003, n. 196, in G.U. 
July 29 2003] § 2. 
36 Directive 95/46, art. 1. 
37 D.Lgs. n. 196/2003, § 2. Paragraph 2 of Section 2 notes that “[t]he processing of 
personal data shall be regulated by affording a high level of protection for the rights and 
protections referred to in paragraph 1 in compliance with the principles . . . by which data 
subjects can exercise such rights and data controllers can fulfill the relevant obligations.” 
Id. § 1(2). 
38 Id. §§ 153–154. 
39 Id. § 23. “Processing” and “personal data” are both defined in the PDPC largely the 
same as they are defined in Article 2 of Directive 95/46. Compare id. § 4(1)(a)–(b), with 
Directive 95/46, art. 2(a)–(b). 
40 D.Lgs. n. 196/2003, § 26(1). “Sensitive data” is defined in the PDPC as “personal 
data allowing the disclosure of racial or ethnic origin, religious, philosophical or other 
beliefs, political opinions, membership of parties, trade unions, associations or organiza-
tions of a religious, philosophical, political or trade-unionist character, as well as personal 
data disclosing health and sex life.” Id. § 4(1)(d). Moreover, Section 26(5) explicitly for-
bids the dissemination of health data. Id. § 26(5). 
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 Section 167 of the PDPC—the provision under which the Google 
executives were sentenced—provides that persons who process per-
sonal data “with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to 
cause harm to another”41 in breach of certain other provisions of the 
PDPC shall be punished by imprisonment for six to thirty-six months, 
depending on the nature of the violation.42 Thus, the Google execu-
tives were convicted of participating in the processing of De Leon’s sen-
sitive personal data without his consent or that of his guardians, without 
the permission of the Garante, and with a view to profit.43 
 Legislative Decree no. 70 of 9 April 2003 implemented the Liabil-
ity Directive in Italy and governs certain aspects of electronic com-
merce.44 Article 16 of the Decree exempts ISSPs from liability for user-
generated content, provided they have no actual knowledge of illegal 
content or activity, and that upon learning of illegal content or activity 
the provider acts “immediately to remove or to disable access” to the 
content.45 For ISSPs whose activities are limited to that of a “mere con-
duit,” “hosting,” or “caching,” Article 17 provides that there is no gen-
eral duty to monitor content.46 
C. The European Court of Justice 
 Not long after the convictions were announced, but before the 
court’s decision was released, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is-
sued a judgment in a trademark infringement case in which it inter-
preted the exemption provisions of the Liability Directive as applied to 
Google’s AdWords marketing system.47 The plaintiffs, purveyors of lux-
ury goods, sued Google for contributory trademark infringement after 
AdWords advertisements for counterfeits of the plaintiffs’ products ap-
peared online.48 AdWords is a paid information referencing service 
which displays “sponsored links” alongside the natural search results of 
a user’s query in Google’s search engine.49 AdWords was also used to 
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. § 167(1). 
42 See id. § 167(1)–(2). 
43 Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 362. 
44 D.Lgs. n. 70/2003, art. 16; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 360. 
45 See D.Lgs. n. 70/2003, art. 16; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 360. 
46 D.Lgs. n. 70/2003, art. 17. 
47 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, paras. 1, 29 (2010) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm, (follow “Case-
law” hyperlink under “Collections”; search “2010” under “Access by Year”; follow “March” 
hyperlink; select Case “C-236/08”). 
48 Id. paras. 28–30. 
49 Id. paras. 23–24. 
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place advertising on Google Video.50 Advertisers are able to reserve 
one or more keywords, and when a search is entered containing those 
keywords a link to the advertised website appears accompanied by a 
short commercial message.51 The process of choosing and reserving 
keywords, drafting the commercial message, and attaching a link, is 
performed exclusively by the advertiser; the advertisements are gener-
ated automatically by AdWords.52 Google charges a fee for this service 
based, among other factors, on the number of clicks the link receives 
and a maximum price per click selected by the advertiser.53 
 The ECJ ruled that Article 14 of the Directive must be interpreted 
to mean that the exemption from liability applies to a service like Ad-
Words if that service “has not played an active role of such a kind as to 
give it knowledge of, or control over, the data stored.”54 If it has not, the 
service “cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the re-
quest of an advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the unlaw-
ful nature of those data or of that advertiser’s activities, it failed to act 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the data concerned.”55 
The ECJ did not rule on whether Google played a sufficiently active 
role, nor if it failed to act expeditiously upon receiving information 
concerning the alleged infringement.56 The ECJ did note, however, that 
it was necessary to determine whether Google was a neutral participant, 
and to examine Google’s role in selecting keywords and drafting the 
commercial message that accompanied the sponsored links.57 The court 
also noted that the mere fact that Google charges a fee for AdWords, 
and that a relationship may exist between the appearance of an adver-
tiser’s keyword and the terms in a user’s query, does not deprive Google 
of the exemption from liability provided for in the Liability Directive.58 
 The ECJ’s judgment reflects the principle embodied in the Liabil-
ity Directive that the free flow of information over the Internet should 
be protected.59 Because of the risk to free expression and electronic 
commerce, the Liability Directive suggests—and the ECJ confirmed— 
                                                                                                                      
50 Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at 17–18 n.30; see Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 363, 372–
73. 
51 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, paras. 23–24. 
52 See id. para. 27. 
53 Id. para. 25. 
54 Id. para. 120. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. para. 119. 
57 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, paras. 114, 118. 
58 Id. paras. 116–117. 
59 See Directive 2000/31, paras. 1–3. 
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that liability for user-generated content should be limited to instances 
in which the ISSP has either participated in illegal activity, or failed to 
prevent or mitigate the damage caused by it.60 
III. Analysis 
 Given the level of statutory protection afforded to ISSPs under 
both EU and Italian law, the conviction of the Google executives is sur-
prising for several reasons. First, the court acknowledges that requiring 
ISSPs to monitor all user-generated content in order to prevent the up-
load of personal data would be impossible; indeed, the court states that 
ISSPs have no legal obligation to do so.61 Because the prohibition on 
legally required monitoring is derived from Article 15 of the Liability 
Directive, it is noteworthy that the court did not discuss the Directive or 
the corresponding Italian Legislative Decree that implemented the Li-
ability Directive in Italy.62 This omission may be partially explained by 
the court’s conclusion that Google Video is not a “mere conduit,” a 
“host,” or limited to “caching” services, but is instead an “active” con-
tent provider and as such is ineligible for the exemption.63 Neverthe-
less, if it is impossible for Google to monitor all content, then imposing 
liability for failing to prevent uploading of illegal content would se-
verely burden Google’s operations in Italy.64 After all, the decision im-
plies that Italian law requires Google to do something that the court 
itself acknowledges is impossible.65 
 Second, several aspects of the court’s decision contradict the ECJ’s 
judgment concerning Google’s AdWords platform.66 The judgment 
suggests that to lose the liability exemption provided in the Liability 
Directive, an ISSP’s activity must cross a certain threshold of active par-
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. paras. 1–3, 5, 8–10; Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, para. 120. 
61 Trib. Ordinario di Milano, 24 febbraio 2010, Sentenza n. 1972/2010 [Ordinary Tri-
bunal of Milan, Feb. 24, 2010, Judgment n. 1972/2010] at 103, available at http:// 
speciali.espresso.repubblica.it//pdf/Motivazioni_sentenza_Google.pdf; see Sartor & Viola, 
supra note 5, at 360. 
62 See Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at 105; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 360. 
63 See Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at 103; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 370. 
64 Cf. Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 360, 370 (noting that court’s approach “would 
have a broad impact on providers of platforms for user-generated contents,” and that “they 
would be in principle liable for all content”). 
65 See Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at 104; Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 360. But see Milton 
Mueller, There’s More to the Google-Italy Case Than Meets the Eye, Internet Governance Pro-
ject (Feb. 25, 2004, 4:31 PM), http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2010/ 
2/25/4466212.html (noting that Google has implemented monitoring for copyright viola-
tions through an automated recognition system). 
66 See Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 370–71. 
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ticipation in the processing of data.67 That is, the ECJ construes the Ar-
ticle 14 exemption broadly, requiring that the ISSP’s participation give 
it actual knowledge of or control over the content.68 By contrast, the 
Italian court implicitly endorses the view that any activity that is more 
than mere storage and the simple facilitation of access is de facto active 
participation, regardless of whether there is knowledge or control.69 
Such a narrow construction of the liability exemption may reflect the 
court’s failure to appreciate the complexity of current technology and 
modern web hosting models.70 Although the ECJ’s judgment preceded 
the release of the opinion by the Italian court, the ECJ case was decided 
after the conviction had been announced.71 Consequently, it is difficult 
to know whether, and to what extent, the ECJ’s judgment played a role 
in Judge Magi’s decision. 
 Nevertheless, the Italian court’s decision also contradicts other 
aspects of the ECJ’s ruling on ISSP exemption from liability.72 In classi-
fying Google as an active content provider, the Italian court pointed to 
advertising revenues and actions taken by Google to encourage users to 
upload video, and reasoned that Google promoted the absence of con-
tent control as an inducement to attract users.73 This reasoning con-
flicts with the ECJ’s determination that liability depends on the rela-
tionship of the ISSP to the content, not on the commercial nature of 
the service, or even whether there is a clear link between keyword ad-
vertising and user queries.74 By construing the liability exemption so 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, para. 120 (2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm, (follow “Case-law” 
hyperlink under “Collections”; search “2010” under “Access by Year”; follow “March” hyper-
link; select Case “C-236/08”). 
68 See id. 
69 See Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 369–71. 
70 See id. at 369–70. When the liability exemptions were drafted, web hosting was a far 
simpler enterprise than it is today with the advent of Web 2.0 and the proliferation of user-
generated content. Id. at 369–70, 374–75; see also Tim O’Reilly & John Battelle, Web 
Squared: Web 2.0 Five Years On 2, available at http://assets.en.oreilly.com/1/event/28/ 
web2009_websquared-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter Web 2.0 White Paper] (“The Web is no 
longer a collection of static pages of HTML that describe something in the world. Increas-
ingly, the Web is the world—everything and everyone in the world casts an ‘information 
shadow,’ an aura of data which . . . offers extraordinary opportunity and mind-bending 
implications.”). 
71 See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 passim; Sentenza n. 1972/2010, at I. 
72 See Sartor & Viola, supra note 5, at 371. 
73 See id. at 370–71. 
74 See Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, paras. 109, 116–117; Sartor & Viola, supra 
note 5, at 371. The ECJ explicitly provided that the “mere fact” that a service provided by 
the ISSP was in exchange for payment does not deprive the ISSP of the liability exemp-
tions under the Directive. Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, para. 116. 
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narrowly, the Italian court excludes ISSPs like Google, YouTube, and 
Facebook, such that operating sites featuring user-generated content 
may be far more difficult or even impossible.75 
 The Italian decision is emblematic of a broader trend in which 
courts have emerged as a source of Internet regulation.76 Given the 
novel, transnational, and ever-evolving nature of the Web, questions of 
Internet governance are difficult and controversial; indeed, a major 
theme in the ongoing debate is whether it ought to be formally regu-
lated at all.77 Additionally, despite the Internet’s growing ubiquity, ques-
tions of Internet governance are still embryonic in the popular con-
sciousness.78 Although many people have cultivated Second Lives 
online,79 far fewer are likely to have considered what rules should gov-
ern the Internet “world.”80 Courts likely reflect this pattern: judges al-
most certainly use the Internet for personal purposes, and some even 
cite Internet sources in judicial opinions.81 But ordinary or even regu-
lar use of a thing does not an expert make.82 
 Beyond the question of judicial familiarity with technology, how-
ever, the potential impact of governments or private interests seeking to 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Donadio, supra note 2; Arthur, supra note 3; Claburn, supra note 2. 
76 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 passim (1997) (striking down Communications 
Decency Act on overbreadth challenge); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento 
De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 passim (4th Cir. 2003) (resolving dispute over domain name own-
ership); Tribunale de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
May 22, 2000, La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (L.I.C.R.A.) & L’Union des 
Estudiants Juifs de France (U.E.J.F.) v. Yahoo! Inc. & Yahoo France, available at http:// 
www.eff.org/legal/Jurisdiction_and_sovereignty/LICRA_v_Yahoo/20001221_yahoo_us_com- 
plaint.pdf passim (enjoining Yahoo from permitting sale of Nazi merchandise in France). 
77 See e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? 179–81 (2006) 
(noting that despite its transformative potential as a global communication tool, the Internet 
cannot function effectively without underlying law and territorial government); Jonathan 
Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It 127–30 (2008) (describing 
the merits of a standard-based approach to internet governance as compared to a rule-based 
approach). 
78 See The Consensus Machine, Economist, June 8, 2000, available at http://www.econ- 
omist. com/node/335281. 
79 See Nelson Linden, Second Life Economy Stable in Q2 2010, Second Life Blogs, (Sept. 
10, 2010, 9:28 AM), http://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2010/09/10/ 
second-life-economy-stable-in-q2–2010 (showing an average of 805,000 monthly repeat 
logins in the second quarter of 2010). 
80 See The Consensus Machine, supra note 78. 
81 See Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’ Use 
of Internet Materials, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 417, 418 n. 3, 428, 448–49 (2002). 
82 See, e.g., Babbage, Yes, The Justices Are Old, Economist: Sci. & Tech. Blog (Apr. 23, 
2010, 13:26), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/04/judges_and_technology; 
Nadya Labi, UK Terrorism-Trial Judge Gets Lesson on Internet, Wired (Aug. 21, 2007), http:// 
www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/magazine/15–09/ps_luddite. 
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control or limit the flow of information is another major area of con-
cern.83 Some commentators have suggested that the Italian decision 
may be an example of such influence; rumors abound that efforts to 
control new media enterprises like Google and YouTube are motivated 
by a desire to protect the business interests of media magnate and Ital-
ian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.84 
 The upshot is that this scenario results in inapt decisions, and it 
permits important questions of policy to be decided on an ad hoc basis 
by inexpert and possibly even biased judges.85 Inevitably, this pattern 
makes the rule of law unpredictable, and as ISSPs are forced to bear 
the burden of this uncertainty, many will attempt to limit the risk of 
liability by avoiding certain markets.86 Indeed, some Internet compa-
nies have declined to operate in up to half of the world’s fifty largest 
economies out of concern for legal uncertainty.87 If, as some say, the 
promise of the Internet lies in its ability to empower people by democ-
ratizing access to information and eliminating barriers to communica-
tion,88 a legal environment that inhibits Internet development through 
unpredictability threatens to retard the realization of that promise.89 
Conclusion 
 The conviction of the Google executives is a recent example of a 
ruling that contradicts existing laws and precedent governing ISSPs 
and the Internet generally. It reveals serious limitations in the ability of 
the existing regulatory edifice to address the complex and novel ques-
tions presented by the evolution of the Internet. Given the dynamic 
                                                                                                                      
83 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 77, at 184 (noting that the influence of the Chi-
nese government is changing the nature of the Internet); Zittrain, supra note 77, at 112–13 
(describing the potential benefits non-democratic regimes might derive from exercising 
control over technology); Bruce Einhorn, How China Controls the Internet, Bloomberg Busi-
nessWeek ( Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2006/nf2006 
0113_6735_db053.htm (arguing that by acceding to Chinese censorship requirements Inter-
net companies facilitate political suppression). 
84 See, e.g., Donadio, supra note 2; Colleen Barry, Berlusconi Moves to Impose Internet Regu-
lation, Business Insider ( Jan. 22, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ber- 
lusconi-moves-to-impose-internet-regulation-2010–1; Jeff Israely, Berlusconi vs. Google: Will Italy 
Censor YouTube?, Time (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599, 
1955569,00. html; Mueller, supra note 65. 
85 Cf. Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 77, at 142 (noting that the judiciary can be “cor-
rupt or incompetent, and can fail to follow the law or reflect the wishes of the people”). 
86 See id. at 144–45. 
87 See id. 
88 See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Trans-
forms Markets and Freedom 1–2, 10 (2006). 
89 See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 77, at 144–45. 
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and rapid nature of technological development, and the comparatively 
static pace of legislation, it is nearly certain that courts will continue to 
have a central role in regulating the Internet for the foreseeable future. 
The likelihood of similarly dissonant rulings from other courts threat-
ens innovation and technological development, which, in turn, limits 
the fundamental promise of the Internet as a force for good. 
